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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Loewe v. Lawlor, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering," and Bed-
ford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n.9 In those
cases it does not clearly appear that the court found, or consid-
ered it necessary to find, that the union was undertaking to pre-
vent the interstate sale of the particular product in competition
with the product of union producers. Yet, such a basis of distinc-
tion was employed in the present case.10 A fair inference is that
those cases can no longer safely be depended upon as rendering
interstate union cooperation unlawful, in the absence of a finding
that there was an intent to restrain competition in the marketing
of goods or services."
H. W. W., JR.
MINERAL LEASE--WARRANTY-DAMAGES FOR EVICTIoN-Plain-
tiffs sued to have themselves declared owners of an undivided
one-fourth interest in a tract of land and to cancel a mineral
lease thereon, insofar as it affected their interest. The lease, cov-
ering an undivided one-half interest in the tract, had been granted
to the defendant Texas Company by the defendant Hunt. It con-
tained the customary warranty of title clause. Upon a finding
in favor of the plaintiffs, the lessee called his lessor in warranty,
praying for a judgment for the amount of one-fourth of the ex-
penses of drilling a well.' Held, the expense of drilling should
not be included as an item of "damage and loss" for which the
lessor is answerable. Martel v. Hunt, 197 So. 402 (La. 1940).
By warranting title to the land leased, the lessor obligated
8. 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349 (1921).
9. 274 U.S. 37, 47 S.Ct. 522, 71 L.Ed. 916 (1927).
10. Loewe v. Lawlor was distinguished from Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
60 S.Ct. 982, 998 (1940). In the latter case the court stated that in Loewe v.
Lawlor the "restraint alleged was not a strike or refusal to work in the com-
plainants' plant, but a secondary boycott by which, through threats to the
manufacturer's wholesale customers and their customers, the Union sought
to compel or induce them not to deal in the product of the complainants and
to purchase the products of other unionized manufacturers." (Italics sup-
plied.) Similar language was employed in distinguishing the Duplex case and
the Bedford case.
11. In reviewing the history of the Sherman Act the court emphasized
the fact that protection of the consuming public from practice in restraint
of free competition was the primary aim of the act. Presumably, the interest
of purchasers and consumers was not sufficiently at stake under the circum-
stances of the instant case to warrant the invocation of the anti-trust law.
1. Warranty claims were also made for one-half of cash bonuses paid
lessor for the lease and for one-half of the royalty paid him out of the oil
produced. Both these claims were allowed.
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himself to maintain the lessee in peaceful possession;2 having de-
faulted on that obligation he became liable in damages.2 Since
the articles of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 on lease do not
specify the measure of damages in case of eviction, we must rely
on the rules as to the obligations of warrantors in case of breach
of contracts generally.4 Under paragraph (1) of Article 1934, a
debtor in good faith is liable only for such damages as were con-
templated, or may reasonably be supposed to have entered into
the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract. The
court found no indication that either party contemplated that
the lessor was to be answerable for drilling expenses in case of
the lessee's eviction."
The court distinguished the present case from Slack v. Riggs,7
where an evicted lessee had recovered the amount of expenses
incurred in his drilling. The most valid distinction8 was the fact
that in the Riggs case the lessee paid nothing for the lease but
obligated himself to drill within a fixed period. Since the obliga-
tion to drill was the agreed upon equivalent of the privilege
granted by the lessor, the value of the privilege can be measured
by the value of the equivalent which is the cost of drilling.9 In
the present case, the Texas Company did not bind itself to drill
but paid a cash bonus for the lease. Using the same formula the
value of the privilege would equal the cash bonus. Consequently,
2. Art. 2692, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The lessor Is bound from the very
nature of the contract, and without any clause to that effect:"
"3. To cause the lessee to be in peaceable possession of the thing during
the continuance of the lease."
3. Art. 2696, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the lessee be evicted, the lessor
is answerable for the damage and loss which he sustained by the interrup-
tion of the lease."
4. Knapp v. Guerin, 144 La. 754, 81 So. 802 (1919).
5. La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. The court stated that it is unbelievable that any sane person would,
for an insignificant cash bonus and one-eighth of the minerals (which was
what the lessor received in this case), lease his land for mining purposes
If he thought by so doing he was assuming an obligation which might result
in his becoming answerable to the lessee for drilling expenses in case his
title should be found to be defective.
7. 177 La. 222, 148 So. 32 (1933).
8. The court found two distinguishing characteristics in addition to the
principal one discussed above. (1) The lessee in the Riggs case had relied
solely on the lessor's warranty without making any independent investiga-
tion; in the principal case there was no such reliance. There seems to be no
real merit to this distinction. (2) The principle that a lessee is entitled to
recover only such damages as were contemplated by the parties-the major
Issue before the court in this case-was not raised in the Riggs case. This
Implies that the Riggs case might have been decided differently if this view
had been urged upon the court. However, the decision there seems correct
under the views expressed above.
9. Fite v. Miller, 192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
by holding the lessor in each case liable for the loss the parties
should have contemplated, i.e., the value of the thing given in
exchange, the court properly allowed the claim for drilling ex-
penses in the Riggs case, and with consistency denied it here.
The foregoing analysis should not be affected by the fact that
oil is found. Although a lessee evicted from a portion of the
property will lose a proportionate part of the production, is he
entitled to a refund of a like part of the cost of drilling? Cer-
tainly, if a lessee, having paid a cash bonus for the privilege of
drilling, fails to find oil, and is subsequently evicted, it cannot
be said that the eviction occasioned his loss of drilling expenses;
the loss would have been the same had he not been evicted. If
we suppose that such a lessee is successful in finding oil and is
then evicted, it appears that the only loss he will suffer because
of the eviction depends upon a contingency-the future produc-
tion of oil. Thus, any loss from eviction other than the thing
given in exchange for the privilege of drilling would depend
upon an uncertain event, and because of its speculative character,
it cannot be supposed that it was within the contemplation of
the parties.
J. T. B.
THEATERS AND SHows-REs IPSA LOQUITUR-SUFFICIENCY OF
PLEADINGS-Plaintiff, while proceeding up a flight of stairs to the
exit of defendant's theater, caught her foot between the floor
carpet and the steps, and was thrown against a seat and injured.
Plaintiff alleged in her petition that the carpet was not firmly
attached and that it bulged from the riser. She also alleged that
the defect had existed for some time, but that she was unable to
state truthfully for exactly how long. She stated further that the
circumstances surrounding the accident were peculiarly under
the control of the defendant, and since ushers used the stairway
regularly, defendant either knew or should have known of the
defect. The district court sustained defendant's exception of no
cause of action. On appeal to the court of appeal, held, the facts
alleged constitute a prima facie case of negligence, and the bur-
den of exculpating himself from blame devolves upon defendant.
Bentz v. Saenger-Ehrlich Enterprises, Inc., 197 So. 659 (La. App.
1940).
Although the question arose with respect to the sufficiency
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